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Abstract
We consider the problem of secure distributed matrix multiplication (SDMM) in which a user wishes to compute the product
of two matrices with the assistance of honest but curious servers. We construct polynomial codes for SDMM by studying a
combinatorial problem on a special type of addition table, which we call the degree table. The codes are based on arithmetic
progressions, and are thus named GASP (Gap Additive Secure Polynomial) Codes. GASP Codes are shown to outperform all
previously known polynomial codes for secure distributed matrix multiplication in terms of download rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of secure distributed matrix multiplication (SDMM), in which a user has two matrices A and B
and wishes to compute their product AB with the assistance of N servers, without leaking any information about A or B to
any server. We assume that all servers are honest and responsive, but that they are curious, in that any T of them may collude
to try to deduce information about either A or B.
When considering the problem of SDMM from an information-theoretic perspective, the primary performance metric used
in the literature is that of the download rate, or simply rate, which we denote by R. The rate R is defined to be the ratio of
the amount of information about AB (in bits) the user downloads from the servers to the total number of downloaded bits.
The goal is to construct a SDMM scheme with rate R as large as possible.
The problem of constructing polynomial codes for SDMM can be summarized as follows. We partition the matrices A and
B as follows:
A =
A1...
AK
 , B = [B1 · · · BL] , so that AB =
A1B1 · · · A1BL... . . . ...
AKB1 · · · AKBL
 , (1)
making sure that all products AkB` are well-defined and of the same size. Clearly, computing the product AB is equivalent to
computing all subproducts AkB`. One then constructs a polynomial h(x) whose coefficients encode the submatrices AkB`, and
has N servers compute evaluations h(a1), . . . , h(aN ). The polynomial h is constructed so that every T -subset of evaluations
reveals no information about A or B, but so that the user can reconstruct all of AB given all N evaluations. This follows the
general mantra of evaluation codes and, in particular, polynomial codes as originally introduced in [6] and [7].
One can view the parameters K and L as controlling the complexity of the matrix multiplication operations the servers must
perform. Imagine a scenario in which one may hire as many servers N as one wants to assist in the SDMM computation,
but the computational capacity of each server is limited. In this scenario, one may have fixed values of K and L, and then
maximizing the rate R becomes a question of minimizing N . This is the general perspective we adopt in the SDMM problem.
A. Related Work
Let A and B be partitioned as in (1), and consider the problem of SDMM with N servers and T -security. In [1], a distributed
matrix multiplication scheme is presented for the case K = L which achieves a download rate of
R1 = K
2
(K + T )2
, or equivalently R1 =
(⌈√
N − T
⌉)2
(⌈√
N − T
⌉
+ T
)2 . (2)
In [2], this is improved to
R2 = KL
(K + T )(L+ 1)− 1 , (3)
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2where the polynomial code uses N = (K + T )(L+ 1)− 1 servers. Given some fixed N and T , the authors of [2] then find a
near-optimal solution to the problem of finding K and L such that (K + T )(L+ 1)− 1 ≤ N and that the rate R2 as above
is maximized. In [5], the authors study the case of T = 1 and obtain a download rate of R = KL/(KL+K + L), which is
the rate of [2] in this case. As far as the present authors are aware, [1], [2], [5] are the only works currently in the literature
which study SDMM from the information-theoretic perspective.
We distinguish the SDMM problem from the case where only one of the matrices must be kept secure. In this case, one
can use methods like Shamir’s secret sharing [3] or Staircase codes [4], if one is also interested in straggler mitigation.
Polynomial codes were originally introduced in [6] in a slightly different setting, namely to mitigate stragglers in distributed
matrix multiplication. This work was followed up by [7] which studied fundamental limits of this problem, introduced a
generalization of polynomial codes known as entangled polynomial codes, and applied similar ideas to other problems in
distributed computing. In [8], the authors develop MatDot and PolyDot codes for distributed matrix multiplication with
stragglers, and show that while the communication cost is higher than that of the polynomial codes of [6], the recovery
threshold, defined to be the minimum number of workers which need to respond to guarantee successful decoding, is much
smaller than that of [6]. The MatDot codes of [8] were then applied to the problem of nearest neighbor estimation in [9].
More fundamental questions about the trade-off in computation cost and communication cost in distributed computing were
previously addressed in [10]. However, the polynomial codes in these aforementioned works are not designed to ensure security.
B. Main Contribution
The main contributions of this work are as follows.
• In Section II we introduce our polynomial code GASP via an explicit example, in order to demonstrate all of the subtleties
of the scheme construction. In Section III we formalize the notion of a polynomial code and introduce basic definitions.
• In Section IV we introduce the key notion of this paper, the degree table of a polynomial code. We prove, in Theorem 1,
that to every degree table corresponds a secure distributed matrix multiplication scheme.
• In Section V, we present a secure distributed matrix multiplication scheme, GASPbig. We show that GASPbig outperforms,
for almost all parameters, all previously known schemes in the literature, in terms of the download rate.
• In Section VI, we present a secure distributed matrix multiplication scheme, GASPsmall. We show that GASPsmall outper-
forms GASPbig when T < min{K,L}.
• In Section VII, we present a secure distributed matrix multiplication scheme, GASP, by combining both GASPsmall and
GASPbig. GASP outperforms all previously known schemes, for almost all parameters, in terms of the download rate.
The rate of GASP, for L ≤ K, is given in Table I. For K < L, the rate is given by interchanging K and L.
Download Rate Regions
KL
KL+K + L
1 = T < L ≤ K
KL
KL+K + L+ T 2 + T − 3 2 ≤ T < L ≤ K
KL
(K + T )(L+ 1)− 1 L ≤ T < K
KL
2KL+ 2T − 1 L ≤ K ≤ T
TABLE I: The download rate of GASP codes.
Fig. 1: Comparison of the Polynomial Code GASP with that of [1] and [2]. We plot the rate of the schemes for K = 20 and
L = 20 on the left, and K = 10 and L = 20 on the right.
3II. A MOTIVATING EXAMPLE: K = L = 3 AND T = 2
We begin our scheme description with the following example, which we present in as much detail as possible to showcase
the essential ingredients of the scheme. In this example we consider the multiplication of two matrices A and B over a finite
field Fq , partitioned as:
A =
A1A2
A3
 , B = [B1 B2 B3]
so that all products AkB` are well-defined and of the same size. The product AB is given by
AB =
A1B1 A1B2 A1B3A2B1 A2B2 A2B3
A3B1 A3B2 A3B3

We construct a scheme which computes each term AkB`, and therefore all of AB, via polynomial interpolation. The scheme
is private against any T = 2 servers colluding to deduce the identities of A and B, and uses a total of N = 18 servers.
Let R1 and R2 be two matrices picked independently and uniformly at random with entries in Fq , both of size equal to the
Ak. Similarly, pick S1 and S2 independently and uniformly at random of size equal to that of the B`. Define polynomials
f(x) = A1x
α1 +A2x
α2 +A3x
α3 +R1x
α4 +R2x
α5
g(x) = B1x
β1 +B2x
β2 +B3x
β3 + S1x
β4 + S2x
β5
where the αk and β` are natural numbers that will be determined shortly.
As in [1], we will recover the products AkB` by interpolating the product h(x) = f(x)g(x). Specifically, for some evaluation
points an ∈ Fq , we will send f(an) and g(an) to server n = 1, . . . , N , who then responds with h(an) = f(an)g(an). These
evaluations will suffice to interpolate all of h(x). In particular, we will be able to retrieve the coefficients of h(x), which in
turn will allow us to decode all the AkB`.
The product h(x) = f(x)g(x) is given by
h(x) =
∑
1≤k,`≤3
AkB`x
αk+β` +
∑
1≤k≤3
4≤`≤5
AkS`x
αk+β` +
∑
4≤k≤5
1≤`≤3
B`Rkx
αk+β` +
∑
4≤k,`≤5
RkS`x
αk+β`
We wish to assign the exponents αk and β` to guarantee decodability. Consider the following condition on the exponents:
αk + β` 6= αk′ + β`′ for all (k, `) ∈ [3]× [3] and all (k′, `′) ∈ [5]× [5] such that (k, `) 6= (k′, `′).
That is, all of the exponents corresponding to the terms we wish to decode must be distinct from all the other exponents
appearing in h(x). This guarantees that each product AkB` appears as the unique coefficient of a unique power of x. The
immediate goal is to minimize the number of distinct powers of x appearing in h(x), subject to the above condition. This will
allow us to minimize the number of servers used by the scheme, thereby maximizing the rate.
The problem of assigning the αk and β` can alternately be phrased as the following combinatorial problem. Consider the
following addition table:
β1 β2 β3 β4 β5
α1 α1 + β1 α1 + β2 α1 + β3 α1 + β4 α1 + β5
α2 α2 + β1 α2 + β2 α2 + β3 α2 + β4 α2 + β5
α3 α3 + β1 α3 + β2 α3 + β3 α3 + β4 α3 + β5
α4 α4 + β1 α4 + β2 α4 + β3 α4 + β4 α4 + β5
α5 α5 + β1 α5 + β2 α5 + β3 α5 + β4 α5 + β5
We call this table the degree table since it encodes the degrees that appear in h(x) = f(x)g(x). With this in mind, we wish
to pick αk, β` ∈ N such that every term in the upper-left 3× 3 block is distinct from every other number in the table. Outside
this block, we wish to minimize the number of distinct integers that appear, in order to minimize the number of non-zero
coefficients of h(x) and therefore the number of required evaluation points.
Consider the assignment
α1 = 0, α2 = 1, α3 = 2, α4 = 9, α5 = 12 and β1 = 0, β2 = 3, β3 = 6, β4 = 9, β5 = 10,
for which the degree table becomes
β1 = 0 β2 = 3 β3 = 6 β4 = 9 β5 = 10
α1 = 0 0 3 6 9 10
α2 = 1 1 4 7 10 11
α3 = 2 2 5 8 11 12
α4 = 9 9 12 15 18 19
α5 = 12 12 15 18 21 22
4which satisfies our decodability condition. Concretely, the polynomial h(x) is now of the form
h(x) = A1B1 + · · ·+A3B3x8 + C9x9 + C10x10 + C11x11 + C12x12 + C15x15 + C18x18 + C19x19 + C21x21 + C22x22
which has N = 18 potentially non-zero coefficients. Here each Cj is a sum of products of matrices where each summand has
either Rk or S` as a factor, and thus their precise nature is not important for decoding. We now show that over a suitable field
Fq , we can find N = 18 evaluation points an which suffice to interpolate h(x).
Let J be the set of exponents which occur in the above expression for h(x), that is,
J = {0, . . . , 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22}
so that |J | = 18. We wish to find an evaluation vector a = (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈ FNq such that the 18×18 generalized Vandermonde
matrix
GV (a,J ) = [ajn] , 1 ≤ n ≤ 18, j ∈ J
is invertible. One can easily check that for q = 29, the assignment an = n (mod 29) for n = 1, . . . , 18 results in
det(GV (a,J )) = 20 6= 0 (mod 29). Thus the coefficients of h(x), in particular the AkB`, are uniquely decodable in the
current scheme.
It is perhaps not obvious that the scheme we have described satisfies the 2-privacy condition. Let us show that this is indeed
the case. As in [1], the 2-privacy condition will be satisfied provided that the matrices
Pn,m =
[
a9n a
12
n
a9m a
12
m
]
, Qn,m =
[
a9n a
10
n
a9m a
10
m
]
are invertible for any pair 1 ≤ n 6= m ≤ 18. We compute
det(Qn,m) = a
9
na
9
m(am − an) and det(Pn,m) = a9na9m(a3m − a3n)
thus provided that a3n 6= a3m for all n 6= m, and none of the an are zero, these matrices will all be invertible. However, we
have gcd(3, q − 1) = 1, thus the map x 7→ x3 is a bijection from F29 to itself. Thus an 6= am implies that a3n 6= a3m for all
n 6= m, and we see that the determinants of the above matrices are all non-zero and hence the 2-privacy condition is satisfied.
For K = L = 3 and T = 2, let R1 denote the download rate of [2] and R2 that of [1]. We have
R1 = K
2
(K + T )(K + 1)− 1 =
9
19
and R2 = K
2
(K + T )2
=
9
25
whereas the scheme we have presented above improves on these constructions to achieve a rate of
R = K
2
K2 + 2K + T 2 + T − 3 =
9
18
=
1
2
.
While this improvement in this example is marginal, we will see later that for large parameters we achieve significant gains
over the polynomial codes of [1], [2].
III. POLYNOMIAL CODES
Let A and B be matrices over a finite field Fq , partitioned as in equation (1) so that all products AkB` are well-defined
and of the same size. Then AB is the block matrix AB = (AkB`)1≤k≤K,1≤`≤L. A polynomial code is a tool for computing
the product AB in a distributed manner, by computing each block AkB`. Formally, we define a polynomial code as follows.
Definition 1. The polynomial code PC(K,L, T,N, α, β) consists of the following data:
(i) positive integers K, L, T , and N ,
(ii) α = (α1, . . . , αK+T ) ∈ NK+T , and
(iii) β = (β1, . . . , βL+T ) ∈ NL+T .
A polynomial code PC(K,L, T,N, α, β) is used to securely compute the product AB as follows. A user chooses T matrices
Rt over Fq of the same size as the Ak independently and uniformly at random, and T matrices St of the same size as the B`
independently and uniformly at random. They define polynomials f(x) and g(x) by
f(x) =
K∑
k=1
Akx
αk +
T∑
t=1
Rtx
αK+t and g(x) =
L∑
`=1
B`x
β` +
T∑
t=1
Stx
βL+t
and let
h(x) = f(x)g(x). (4)
Given N servers, a user chooses evaluation points a1, . . . , aN ∈ Fqr in some finite extension Fqr of Fq . They then send f(an)
and g(an) to server n = 1, . . . , N , who computes the product f(an)g(an) = h(an) and transmits it back to the user. The user
5then interpolates the polynomial h(x) given all of the evaluations h(an), and attempts to recover all products AkB` from the
coefficients of h(x). We omit the evaluation vector a from the notation PC(K,L, T,N, α, β) because as we will shortly show,
it does not really affect any important analysis of the polynomial code.
Definition 2. A polynomial code PC(K,L, T,N, α, β) is decodable and T -secure if there exists some evaluation vector
a = (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈ FNqr for some r > 0 such that for any A and B as above, the following two conditions hold.
(i) (Decodability) All products AkB` for k = 1, . . . ,K and ` = 1, . . . , L are completely determined by the evaluations h(an)
for n = 1, . . . , N .
(ii) (T -security) For any T -tuple {n1, . . . , nT } ⊆ [N ], we have
I(f(an1), g(an1), . . . , f(anT ), g(anT );A,B) = 0.
where I(·; ·) denotes mutual information between two random variables.
Definition 3. Suppose that the polynomial code PC(K,L, T,N, α, β) is decodable and T -secure. The download rate, or simply
the rate, of this polynomial code is defined to be
R = KL
N
.
Given parameters K, L, and T , the goal of polynomial coding is to construct a decodable and T -secure polynomial code
PC(K,L, T, α, β) with download rate as large as possible. This is equivalent to minimizing the number of servers N , or
equivalently, the number of evaluation points needed by the code.
IV. THE DEGREE TABLE
In this section we relate the construction of polynomial codes for SDMM with a certain combinatorial problem. This
connection will guide our constructions and aid us in proving that our polynomial codes are decodable and T -secure.
Definition 4. Let α ∈ NK+T and β ∈ NL+T . The outer sum α⊕ β ∈ N(K+T )×(L+T ) of α and β is defined to be the matrix
α⊕ β =
 α1 + β1 · · · α1 + βL+T... . . . ...
αK+T + β1 · · · αK+T + βL+T
 .
Definition 5. Let α ∈ NK+T and β ∈ NL+T . We say that the outer sum α ⊕ β is decodable and T -secure if the following
two conditions hold:
(i) (Decodability) (α⊕ β)k,` 6= (α⊕ β)k′,`′ for all (k, `) ∈ [K]× [L] and all (k′, `′) ∈ [K + T ]× [L+ T ].
(ii) (T -security) αK+t 6= αK+t′ and βL+t 6= βL+t′ for every t 6= t′ ∈ [T ].
Constructing α and β so that α ⊕ β is decodable and T -secure can be realized as the following combinatorial problem,
displayed in Table II. The condition of decodability from Definition 5 simply states that each αk+β` in the red block must be
distinct from every other entry in α⊕ β. The condition of T -security states that all αK+t in the green block must be pairwise
distinct, and all βL+t in the blue block must be pairwise distinct. We refer to this table as the degree table.
β1 · · · βL βL+1 · · · βL+T
α1 α1 + β1 · · · α1 + βL α1 + βL+1 · · · α1 + βL+T
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
αK αK + β1 · · · αK + βL αK + βL+1 · · · αK + βL+T
αK+1 αK+1 + β1 · · · αK+1 + βL αK+1 + βL+1 · · · αK+1 + βL+T
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
αK+T αK+T + β1 · · · αK+T + βL αK+T + βL+1 · · · αK+T + βL+T
TABLE II: The combinatorial problem of constructing α and β so that α⊕ β is decodable and T -secure.
Definition 6. Let A be a matrix with entries in N. We define the terms of A to be the set
termsA = {n ∈ N : ∃(i, j), Aij = n}.
The next lemma and theorem allow us to reduce the construction of Polynomial Codes for SDMM to the combinatorial
problem of constructing α and β such that the degree table, α ⊕ β, is decodable and T -secure. The proof of the lemma is
straightforward and thus omitted.
6Lemma 1. Consider the polynomial code PC(K,L, T,N, α, β), with associated polynomials
f(x) =
K∑
k=1
Akx
αk and g(x) =
L∑
`=1
B`x
β` .
Then we can express the product h(x) of f(x) and g(x) as
h(x) = f(x)g(x) =
∑
j∈J
Cjx
j (5)
for some matrices Cj , where J = terms(α⊕ β).
Thus, the terms in the outer sum α ⊕ β correspond to the terms in the polynomial h(x) = f(x)g(x). Because of this, we
refer to the table representation of α ⊕ β in Table II as the degree table of the polynomial code PC(K,L, T,N, α, β). The
following theorem allows us to reduce the construction of polynomial codes to the construction of degree tables which are
decodable and T -secure.
Theorem 1. Let PC(K,L, T,N, α, β) be a polynomial code, where N = | terms(α ⊕ β)|. Suppose that the degree table,
α⊕ β, satisfies the decodability and T -security conditions of Definition 5. Then the polynomial code PC(K,L, T,N, α, β) is
decodable and T -secure.
Proof: The proof is an application of the Schwarz-Zippel Lemma. One finds sufficient conditions for decodability and
T -security that reduce to the simultaneous non-vanishing of 2
(
N
T
)
+ 1 determinants. One can find a point a ∈ FNqr for some
r > 0 at which none of these polynomials is zero. We relegate a detailed proof to the Appendix.
Thanks to Theorem 1, constructing a polynomial code scheme for secure distributed matrix multiplication can be done
by constructing α and β such that the degree table, α ⊕ β, is decodable and T -secure. For this reason, the visualization in
Table II is extremely useful, both as a guide for constructing polynomial codes for SDMM and as a method for calculating
the corresponding download rate. In this context, maximizing the download rate is equivalent to minimizing | terms(α⊕ β)|,
the number of distinct integers in the degree table shown in Table II, subject to decodability and T -security.
Remark 1. Suppose that the degree table, α⊕β, is decodable and T -secure, and let K be an algebraic closure of Fq . One can
show that the set of all a = (a1, . . . , aN ) such that PC(K,L, T,N, α, β) is decodable and T -secure is a Zariski open subset of
KN . In practice, this means that given K,L, T, α, β, if we choose a ∈ FNqr uniformly at random, then the probability that the
polynomial code PC(K,L, T,N, α, β) is decodable and T -secure goes to 1 as r →∞. Thus, finding such evaluation vectors
is not a difficult task.
V. A POLYNOMIAL CODE FOR BIG T
In this section, we construct a polynomial code, GASPbig, which has better rate than all previous schemes in the literature.
The scheme construction chooses α and β to attempt to minimize the number of distinct integers in the degree table, α⊕ β.
The scheme construction proceeds by choosing αk and β` to belong to certain arithmetic progressions, and minimizes the
number of terms in the lower-right T × T block of the degree table, α⊕ β, shown in Table III.
Definition 7. Given K, L, and T , define the polynomial code GASPbig as follows. Let α and β be given by
αk =
{
k − 1 if 1 ≤ k ≤ K
KL+ t− 1 if k = K + t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T , β` =
{
K(`− 1) if 1 ≤ ` ≤ L
KL+ t− 1 if ` = L+ t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (6)
if L ≤ K and
α` =
{
K(`− 1) if 1 ≤ ` ≤ L
KL+ t− 1 if ` = L+ t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T , βk =
{
k − 1 if 1 ≤ k ≤ K
KL+ t− 1 if k = K + t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (7)
if K < L.
Lastly, define N = | terms(α⊕ β)|. Then GASPbig is defined to be the polynomial code PC(K,L, T,N, α, β).
A. Decodability and T -security
Theorem 2. The polynomial code GASPbig is decodable and T -secure.
Proof: We show that α ⊕ β is decodable and T -secure, and the result then follows from Theorem 1. If L ≤ K, then α
and β are as in (6). Suppose that k ∈ [K] and ` ∈ [L], so that αk + β` = k− 1 +K(`− 1). As k and ` range over all of [K]
and [L], respectively, each such number gives a unique integer in the interval [0,KL − 1]. As every other term in the outer
sum α⊕β is greater than or equal to KL, we see that the decodability condition of Definition 5 is satisfied. As for T -security,
it is clear that all αK+t for t ∈ [T ] are distinct, and all βL+t for t ∈ [T ] are distinct. Therefore the T -security condition of
Definition 5 is satisfied. If K < L then the same argument holds by interchanging α and β.
7β1 = 0 · · · βL = K(L− 1) βL+1 = KL βL+2 = KL+ 1 · · · βL+T = KL+ T − 1
α1 = 0 0 · · · K(L− 1) KL KL+ 1 · · · KL+ T − 1
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
αK = K − 1 K − 1 · · · KL− 1 KL+K − 1 KL+K · · · KL+K + T − 2
αK+1 = KL KL · · · 2KL−K 2KL 2KL+ 1 · · · 2KL+ T − 1
αK+2 = KL+ 1 KL+ 1 · · · 2KL−K + 1 2KL+ 1 2KL+ 2 · · · 2KL+ T
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
αK+T = KL+ T − 1 KL+ T − 1 · · · 2KL−K + T − 1 2KL+ T − 1 2KL+ T · · · 2KL+ 2T − 2
TABLE III: The degree table, α⊕ β, for the vectors α and β as per (6).
B. Download Rate
To compute the number of terms in the degree table of GASPbig, we divide the table into four regions.
• Upper Left: UL = {(α⊕ β)ij : 1 ≤ i ≤ K, 1 ≤ j ≤ L}.
• Upper Right: UR = {(α⊕ β)ij : 1 ≤ i ≤ K,L+ 1 ≤ j ≤ L+ T}.
• Lower Left: LL = {(α⊕ β)ij : K + 1 ≤ i ≤ K + T, 1 ≤ j ≤ L}.
• Lower Right: LR = {(α⊕ β)ij : K + 1 ≤ i ≤ K + T, L+ 1 ≤ j ≤ L+ T}.
Then, we compute the number of terms in each of these regions and use the inclusion-exclusion principle to obtain the
number of terms in the whole table.
Theorem 3. Let N = | terms(α⊕ β)|, where α and β are as in Definition 7. Then N is given by
N =
{
(K + T )(L+ 1)− 1 if T < K
2KL+ 2T − 1 if T ≥ K (8)
if L ≤ K, and
N =
{
(L+ T )(K + 1)− 1 if T < L
2KL+ 2T − 1 if T ≥ L (9)
if K < L.
Consequently, the polynomial code GASPbig(K,L, T ) has rate R = KL/N , where N is as in (8) or (9).
Proof: The degree table, α ⊕ β, is shown in Table III. We first prove for the case where L ≤ K. We denote by [A : B]
the set of all integers in the interval [A,B]. We can describe the terms of the four blocks of α⊕ β as follows:
terms(UL) = [0 : KL− 1]
terms(UR) = [KL : KL+K + T − 2]
terms(LL) =
L−1⋃
`=0
[KL+K(`− 1) : KL+K(`− 1) + T − 1]
terms(LR) = [2KL : 2KL+ 2T − 2]
(10)
The sizes of these sets is given by
| terms(UL)| = KL
| terms(UR)| = K + T − 1
| terms(LL)| =
{
LT if T ≤ K
KL−K + T if T ≥ K
| terms(LR)| = 2T − 1
(11)
Since the largest term in UL is smaller than any term on the other blocks, terms(UL) is disjoint from the terms of the other
blocks. One then observes that the pairwise intersections of the sets of terms of the blocks are given by
terms(UR) ∩ terms(LL) =
{
[K : K + T − 1] if L = 1
[KL : KL+ T − 1] ∪ [KL+K : KL+K + T − 2] if L ≥ 2
terms(LL) ∩ terms(LR) = [2KL : 2KL−K + T − 1]
terms(UR) ∩ terms(LR) = [2KL : KL+K + T − 2]
(12)
8The sizes of these pairwise intersections are now calculated to be
| terms(UR) ∩ terms(LL)| =
 T if L = 12T − 1 if L ≥ 2, T ≤ K
K + T − 1 if L ≥ 2, T ≥ K
| terms(LL) ∩ terms(LR)| =
{
0 T ≤ K
T −K T ≥ K
| terms(UR) ∩ terms(LR)| =
{
0 T ≤ K(L− 1) + 1
T − (K(L− 1) + 1) T ≥ K(L− 1) + 1
Finally, the triple intersection is given by
terms(UR) ∩ terms(LL) ∩ terms(LR) = [2KL : min{2KL−K + T − 1,KL+K + T − 2}]
We have 2KL−K + T − 1 ≤ KL+K + T − 2 if and only if L = 1. One now computes that
| terms(UR) ∩ terms(LL) ∩ terms(LR)| =

0 if L = 1, T ≤ K
T −K if L = 1, T ≥ K
0 if L ≥ 2, T ≤ K(L− 1) + 1
T − (K(L− 1) + 1) if L ≥ 2, T ≥ K(L− 1) + 1
We can now compute N = | terms(α⊕ β)| by using the inclusion-exclusion principle, as
N = | terms(α⊕ β)| = | terms(UL)|+ | terms(UR)|+ | terms(LL)|+ | terms(LR)|
− | terms(UR) ∩ terms(LL)| − | terms(LL) ∩ terms(LR)| − | terms(UR) ∩ terms(LR)|
+ | terms(UR) ∩ terms(LR) ∩ terms(LL)|.
For K < L, the proof is analogous by interchanging α and β.
Remark 2. If we take K = L = 1, then the polynomial code GASPbig(1, 1, T ) uses N = 2T +1 servers. Thus for any N we
can construct a polynomial code for any T ≤ ⌊N−12 ⌋, which is the same range of allowable T as in [2].
C. Performance
We now compare GASPbig with the polynomial codes of [1] and [2]. Indeed, we show that it outperforms them for most
parameters. To do this it suffices, because of (3), to show that N , as defined in Theorem 3, is smaller than (K+T )(L+1)−1.
Theorem 4. Let N be defined as in Theorem 3. Then, N ≤ (K + T )(L+ 1)− 1.
Proof: Suppose L ≤ K. Then N is as in (8). We will analyze each case.
• If T < K: then (K + T )(L+ 1)− 1 = N .
• If T ≥ K: then 0 ≤ (L− 1)(T −K) = ((K + T )(L+ 1)− 1)− (2KL+ 2T − 1).
Thus, (K + T )(L+ 1)− 1 ≥ 2KL+ 2T − 1 = N .
The result for K < L follows by switching the roles of K and L in the above calculation.
Fig. 2: Comparison of the Polynomial Code GASPbig with that of [2]. We plot the rate of both schemes for K = L = 20 on
the left, and K = 10, L = 20 on the right.
9VI. A POLYNOMIAL CODE FOR SMALL T
In this section, we construct a polynomial code GASPsmall which outperforms GASPbig when T < min{K,L}. This is done
by choosing the αk and β` to lie in certain arithmetic progressions so that the columns of the upper-right block of α ⊕ β,
shown in Table IV, overlap as much as possible, and similarly for the columns of the lower-left block. For T small relative to
K and L, these two blocks are much bigger than the lower-right block, which the scheme construction essentially ignores.
Definition 8. Given K, L, and T , define the polynomial code GASPsmall as follows. Let α and β be given by
αk =
{
k − 1 if 1 ≤ k ≤ K
KL+K(t− 1) if k = K + t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T , β` =
{
K(`− 1) if 1 ≤ ` ≤ L
KL+ t− 1 if ` = L+ t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T. (13)
if K ≤ L, and
α` =
{
K(`− 1) if 1 ≤ ` ≤ L
KL+ t− 1 if ` = L+ t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T. , βk =
{
k − 1 if 1 ≤ k ≤ K
KL+K(t− 1) if k = K + t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (14)
if L < K.
Lastly, define N = | terms(α⊕ β)|. Then GASPsmall is defined to be the polynomial code PC(K,L, T,N, α, β).
The example in Section II is exactly the polynomial code GASPsmall when K = L = 3 and T = 2. In what follows we
show that GASPsmall is decodable and T -secure, and compute its download rate. Throughout this section, α and β will be as
in Definition 8.
β1 = 0 · · · βL = K(L− 1) βL+1 = KL βL+2 = KL+ 1 · · · βL+T = KL+ T − 1
α1 = 0 0 · · · K(L− 1) KL KL+ 1 · · · KL+ T − 1
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
αK = K − 1 K − 1 · · · KL− 1 KL+K − 1 KL+K · · · KL+K + T − 2
αK+1 = KL KL · · · 2KL−K 2KL 2KL+ 1 · · · 2KL+ T − 1
αK+2 = KL+K KL+K · · · 2KL 2KL+K 2KL+K + 1 · · · 2KL+K + T − 1
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
αK+T = KL+K(T − 1) KL+K(T − 1) · · · 2KL+K(T − 2) 2KL+K(T − 1) 2KL+K(T − 1) + 1 · · · 2KL+ (K + 1)(T − 1)
TABLE IV: The degree table, α⊕ β, of the vectors α and β as per Definition 8.
A. Decodability and T -security
Theorem 5. The polynomial code GASPsmall(K,L, T ) is decodable and T -secure.
Proof: Analogous to Theorem 2.
B. Download Rate
We now find the download rate of GASPsmall by computing N = | terms(α⊕ β)|.
Theorem 6. Let N = | terms(α⊕ β)|, where α and β are as in Definition 8. Then N is given by
N =

2K + T 2 if L = 1, T < K
KT +K + T if L = 1, T ≥ K
KL+K + L if L ≥ 2, 1 = T < K
KL+K + L+ T 2 + T − 3 if L ≥ 2, 2 ≤ T < K
KL+KT + L+ 2T − 3− ⌊T−2K ⌋ if L ≥ 2,K ≤ T ≤ K(L− 1) + 1
2KL+KT −K + T if L ≥ 2,K(L− 1) + 1 ≤ T
(15)
if K ≤ L, and
N =

2L+ T 2 if K = 1, T < L
LT + L+ T if K = 1, T ≥ L
KL+K + L if K ≥ 2, 1 = T < L
KL+K + L+ T 2 + T − 3 if K ≥ 2, 2 ≤ T < L
KL+ LT +K + 2T − 3− ⌊T−2L ⌋ if K ≥ 2, L ≤ T ≤ L(K − 1) + 1
2KL+ LT − L+ T if K ≥ 2, L(K − 1) + 1 ≤ T
(16)
if L < K.
Consequently, the polynomial code GASPsmall has rate R = KL/N , where N is as in (15) or (16).
Proof: The degree table, α ⊕ β, is is shown in Table IV. We first prove for the case where L ≤ K. As in section V-B,
we let UL, UR, LL, and LR be the upper-left, upper-right, lower-left, and lower-right blocks, respectively, of α⊕ β. We first
count the number in each block, and then study the intersections of the blocks.
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It will be convenient to adopt the following notation. For integers A, B, and C, let [A : B | C] be the set of all multiples
of C in the interval [A,B]. If A = DC is a multiple of C, we have
|[DC : B | C]| =
(⌊
B
C
⌋
−D + 1
)+
where x+ = max{x, 0}. If C = 1 then we write [A : B] instead of [A : B | 1], so that [A : B] denotes all the integers in the
interval [A,B].
The sets terms(UL), terms(UR), terms(LL), and terms(LR) are given by
terms(UL) = [0 : KL− 1]
terms(UR) = [KL : KL+K + T − 2]
terms(LL) = [KL : 2KL+K(T − 2) | K]
terms(LR) =
T⋃
t=1
[2KL+K(t− 1) : 2KL+K(t− 1) + T − 1]
(17)
From these expressions, one can count the sizes of the above sets to be
| terms(UL)| = KL
| terms(UR)| = K + T − 1
| terms(LL)| = L+ T − 1
| terms(LR)| =
{
T 2 if T < K
KT −K + T if T ≥ K
(18)
To understand the last expression above, note that the intervals in the union expression for terms(LR) consist of all integers
from 2KL to 2KL+ (K + 1)(T − 1) exactly when T ≥ K.
As for intersections, clearly terms(UL) intersects none of the sets of terms from the other blocks. Thus it suffices to
understand the pairwise intersections among the other three blocks, and the triple intersection of the other three blocks. Two
of these pairwise intersections and their sizes are easily understood:
terms(UR) ∩ terms(LL) = [KL : KL+K + T − 2 | K], | terms(UR) ∩ terms(LL)| =
⌊
T − 2
K
⌋
+ 2
terms(LL) ∩ terms(LR) = [2KL : 2KL+K(T − 2) | K], | terms(LL) ∩ terms(LR)| = T − 1
(19)
Understanding the intersection terms(UR) ∩ terms(LR) is a bit more subtle, and we break the problem into two cases. If
T ≥ K, then terms(LR) = [2KL : 2KL + (K + 1)(T − 1)]. Since terms(UR) = [KL : KL + K + T − 2], we see that
terms(UR) ∩ terms(LR) = [2KL : KL+K + T − 2]. In the case T < K we have 2KL > KL+K + T − 2 and thus the
intersection is empty, unless L = 1, in which case terms(UR) ∩ terms(LR) = [2K : 2K + T − 2]. It follows that
| terms(UR) ∩ terms(LR)| =
 T − 1 if T < K,L = 10 if T < K,L ≥ 2
(T − (K(L− 1) + 1))+ if T ≥ K
(20)
It remains to count the size of the triple intersection. First suppose that T < K, which we break into two subcases: (i)
L = 1 and (ii) L ≥ 2. If L = 1 and T = 1, then the triple intersection is empty, but if T > 1 then all three blocks intersect in
the lone terms 2K. If L ≥ 2, then the triple intersection is again empty by the above paragraph. Now suppose that T ≥ K.
In this case the intersection is the set [2KL : KL+K + T − 2 | K], which has size (⌊T−2K ⌋− L+ 2)+. We therefore have
| terms(UR) ∩ terms(LR) ∩ terms(LL)| =

0 if L = 1, 1 = T < K
1 if L = 1, 2 ≤ T < K
0 if L ≥ 2, T < K(⌊
T−2
K
⌋− L+ 2)+ if T ≥ K
(21)
We can now compute N = | terms(α⊕ β)| by using the inclusion-exclusion principle, as
N = | terms(α⊕ β)| = | terms(UL)|+ | terms(UR)|+ | terms(LL)|+ | terms(LR)|
− | terms(UR) ∩ terms(LL)| − | terms(LL) ∩ terms(LR)| − | terms(UR) ∩ terms(LR)|
+ | terms(UR) ∩ terms(LR) ∩ terms(LL)|.
The above computation is straightforward given that we have already calculated the sizes of each of the individual sets. The
only subtlety in deriving the formula (15) for N arises in the case that L ≥ 2 and K(L− 1) + 1 ≤ T . In this case, one uses
the fact that
T −K(L− 1) + 1 ≥ 0⇔
⌊
T − 2
K
⌋
− L+ 2 ≥ 0.
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From this equivalence and equations (20) and (21) one can use inclusion-exclusion to compute the value of N .
For K < L, the proof is analogous by interchanging α and β.
Remark 3. The above construction for small T is from where the name GASP (Gap Additive Secure Polynomial) is derived.
The construction allows for gaps in the degrees of monomials appearing as summands of h(x), as was observed in the example
in Section II. Allowing for these gaps gives one more flexibility in how the vectors α and β are chosen to attempt to minimize
N = | terms(α⊕ β)|. Note that for very large T , the inequality T ≥ K(L− 1)+ 1 has forced the outer sum α⊕ β to contain
every integer from 0 to 2KL+ (K + 1)(T − 1), with no gaps.
C. Performance
We now show that GASPsmall outperforms GASPbig when T < min{K,L}.
Theorem 7. Let T < min{K,L}. Then Nsmall ≤ Nbig.
Proof: We will analyze each case.
• If T = 1: then Nbig = KL+K + L = Nsmall.
• If T ≥ 2: then 0 ≤ (T + 1)(T − 1)− T 2 + 2 ≤ L(T − 1)− T 2 + 2 = Nbig −Nsmall.
Thus, Nbig ≥ Nsmall.
Fig. 3: Comparison between GASPsmall and GASPbig. We plot the rate of both schemes for K = 20 and L = 20 on the left,
and K = 20 and L = 10 on the right. As shown, GASPsmall outperforms GASPbig for T < max{K,L}.
VII. COMBINING BOTH SCHEMES
In this section, we construct a polynomial, GASP, by combining both GASPsmall and GASPbig. By construction, GASP has
a better rate than all previous schemes.
Definition 9. Given K, L, and T , we define the polynomial code GASP to be
GASP =
{
GASPsmall if T < min{K,L}
GASPbig if T ≥ min{K,L}. (22)
Theorem 8. For L ≤ K, the polynomial code GASP has rate,
R =

KL
KL+K + L
if 1 = T < L ≤ K
KL
KL+K + L+ T 2 + T − 3 if 2 ≤ T < L ≤ K
KL
(K + T )(L+ 1)− 1 if L ≤ T < K
KL
2KL+ 2T − 1 if L ≤ K ≤ T
For K < L, the rate is given by interchanging K and L.
Proof: Follows immediately from Theorems 3, 6, and 7.
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A. Fixed Computation Load
We now compare the rate of GASP with those of [1] and [2] when K and L are fixed. Throughout this section, we let
R1 = K
2
(K + T )2
and R2 = KL
(K + T )(L+ 1)− 1 . (23)
Here R1 and R2 are the rates of the polynomial codes in [1] and [2], respectively.
Fig. 4: Comparison of the Polynomial Code GASP with that of [1] and [2]. We plot the rate of the schemes for K = 20 and
L = 20 on the left, and K = 10 and L = 20 on the right.
B. Fixed number of workers
To deepen the comparison with [2], we plot the download rates R and R2 as functions of the total number N of servers
and the security level T . For GASP and the polynomial code of [2], given some N and T , we must calculate a K and L
for which the expression for the required number of servers is less than the given N , and which ideally maximizes the rate
function. In [2, Theorem 1], the authors propose the solution
Lˆ = max
{
1,
⌈
−3
2
+
√
1
4
+
N
T
⌉}
, Kˆ =
⌊
N + 1
Lˆ+ 1
− T
⌋
(24)
which, for a given N and T , is shown to satisfy (Kˆ + T )(Lˆ+ 1)− 1 ≤ N and nearly maximize the rate function R1.
For a given N and T , optimizing the rate of GASP presents one with the following optimization problem:
max
K,L
Rmax = KL
min{Nsmall, Nbig}
subject to min{Nsmall, Nbig} ≤ N
(25)
Due to the complicated nature of the expressions for Nsmall and Nbig, we will not attempt to solve this optimization problem
analytically. Instead, for the purposes of the present comparison with [2], we simply solve (25) by brute force for each specific
value of N and T .
In Fig. 5 we plot the download rate of GASP versus the download rate of the polynomial code of [2], for N = 50 and
N = 100 servers. The optimal values of K and L for GASP were computed by solving (25) by brute force. The values of K
and L for the scheme of [2] were those of (24).
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Fig. 5: The rate of GASP and of the the polynomial code of [2], as a function of the level of security T , for N = 50 servers
on the left, and N = 100 servers on the right. The optimal rate of GASP for a given N and T was computed by finding a
solution to (25) by brute force.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We will require the following definition throughout the proof of Theorem 1.
Definition 10. Let Fq be a finite field, let a = (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈ FNq , and let J be a set of non-negative integers of size |J | = N .
We define the Generalized Vandermonde Matrix GV (a,J ) ∈ FN×Nq to be
GV (a,J ) = [ajn] , 1 ≤ n ≤ N, j ∈ J .
Note that if J = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} and the an are all chosen distinct, then GV (a,J ) is the familiar N ×N Vandermonde
matrix associated with the an, and is invertible if and only if the an are distinct.
We begin proving Theorem 1 by stating the following useful Lemma. For all practical purposes, this reduces checking
decodability and T -security to checking polynomial conditions. We say a matrix has the MDS property if every maximal minor
has non-zero determinant. Equivalently, the matrix is the generator matrix of an MDS code.
Lemma 2. Let PC(K,L, T, α, β) be a polynomial code, such that α⊕ β is decodable and T -secure. Suppose that there is an
evaluation vector a = (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈ FNqr such that the following properties hold:
(i) (Decodability) The Generalized Vandermonde Matrix GV (a,J ) is invertible.
(ii) (T -privacy) The T ×N matrices
P =
[
a
αK+t
n
]
and Q =
[
a
βL+t
n
]
,
where 1 ≤ t ≤ T and 1 ≤ n ≤ N , have the MDS property.
Then PC(K,L, T, α, β) is decodable and T -secure.
Proof: Since the matrix GV (a,J ) is invertible, the polynomial h(x) = ∑j∈J Cjxj can be interpolated from the
evaluations h(an), for n = 1, . . . , N . Thus the user can recover all of the coefficients of h(x). By the decodability condition
of the outer sum α⊕ β, the user can then recover all products AkB`.
The argument for T -privacy is familiar and follows the proof of T -security in [1]. One shows that, given the above condition,
any T -tuple of matrices f(an1), . . . , f(anT ) is uniform random on the space of all T -tuples of matrices of the appropriate
size, and is independent of A. The same argument works for B.
Let us now finish the proof of Theorem 1. Let X = (X1, . . . , XN ) be a vector of variables and consider the polynomial
D(X) = det(GV (X,J )). (26)
Additionally, if T = {n1, . . . , nT } ⊆ [N ] is any set of size T , define
PT (X) = det
[
X
αK+t
nt
]
and QT (X) = det
[
X
βL+t
nt
]
. (27)
By Lemma 2, it suffices to find an evaluation vector a ∈ FNqr such that D(a) 6= 0, PT (a) 6= 0, and QT (a) 6= 0 for all T ⊆ [N ]
of size T . By the assumption that α⊕ β is decodable and T -secure, none of the polynomials D(X), PT (X), and QT (X) are
zero, and all have degree bounded by J :=
∑
j∈J j.
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Now consider a finite extension Fqr of Fq and a subset G ⊆ Fqr of size G >
(
2
(
N
T
)
+ 1
)
J . Sample each entry an of a
uniformly at random from G. Let E be the union of the events D(a) = 0, PT (a) = 0, and QT (a) = 0 for all T ⊆ [N ] of
size T . To finish the proof, it suffices to show that Pr(E) < 1. By the union bound and the Schwarz-Zippel Lemma, we have
Pr(E) ≤ Pr(D(a) = 0) +
∑
T ⊆[N ]
|T |=T
Pr(PT (a) = 0) +
∑
T ⊆[N ]
|T |=T
Pr(QT (a) = 0) ≤
(
2
(
N
T
)
+ 1
)
J
G
< 1.
This completes the proof of the Theorem. 
B. A Note on the Communication Rate
The results in this paper were presented in terms of the download rate, not accounting for the upload rate and, therefore,
the total communication rate of the scheme. This was done since the previous literature on this subject, [1], [2], and [5], all
used the download rate as their measure of performance. We will now see that both the download rate and the upload rate for
polynomial codes both depend on the number, N , of servers.
Let A ∈ Fr×sq and B ∈ Fs×tq . As in (1), partition them as follows:
A =
A1...
AK
 , B = [B1 · · · BL] , so that AB =
A1B1 · · · A1BL... . . . ...
AKB1 · · · AKBL
 .
Thus, each Ai ∈ F
r
K×s
q and each Bi ∈ Fs×
t
L
q . The random matrices will also belong, respectively, to these spaces.
Using a polynomial code a user will send a linear combination of the A’s and R’s and another one of the B’s and S’s to
each server, requiring an upload of rs/K + st/L symbols per server, for a total upload cost of N(rs/K + st/L) symbols.
Each server will then multiply the two matrices they received and send the user a matrix of dimensions r/K× t/L, for a total
download cost of Nrt/KL.
Thus, under our framework, minimizing the download, upload, or total communication costs are all equivalent to minimizing
the number of servers, N .
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